A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Thus, occupiers of this position face the challenge of setting out a plausible rationale for drawing the line where they do. The counterpart has exactly the same dispositions as the Nazi sympathizer, but lives a quiet and harmless life in Argentina.
Revised Oxford Translation, J. Notably, there has recently been an attempt by philosophers to appeal to results from empirical psychology to explain away some set of intuitions or other, and this strategy has been applied in the area of moral luck in particular.
Finally, Zimmerman goes on to claim that his reasoning applies even to cases in which a person's actions are causally determined.
Responding to the Problem: At least in some cases, these can be tempered when we reflect explicitly on key features of cases, and our initial responses can be revised in light of these reflections, together with reflection on general principles.
This relationship between the controversy about free will versus determinism and worries about causal luck might, as has sometimes been suggested, be applied to the whole problem of moral luck.
Just as the problem of skepticism emerges from the clash of our intuition that knowledge should be certain and non-accidental with the fact that few, if any, of our true beliefs are entirely certain or free from accident, so: It seems that morality can only insulate itself from luck at the expense of foregoing supreme value.
Along these lines, we find passages like the following: On reflection, we can see that we ought to blame the racists only for their actions or omissions, not for the attitudes themselves over which they have no control. Even if, prior to making his decision, Gauguin had good reason to think he had considerable artistic talent, he could not be sure what would come of that talent, nor whether the decision to leave his family Nagel moral luck essay help or hinder the development of that talent.
This reasoning can be extended still further to cover the case of constitutive and even one kind of causal luck.
Now the line of reasoning sketched above that rejects any tracking of results in punishment depends not only on the Control Principle or a modified version of itbut also on a thesis that limits justified punishment to the proper objects of moral blameworthiness.
Once we acknowledge this cost, we can keep morality intact although skeptical doubts about its ability to resist luck can still be raisedbut we have lost our reason to care about it.
And, further, one might be more blameworthy in the case in which one kills the dog than in the case in which one takes the same risk but luckily reaches home without hitting anything.
Yet once we distinguish these legitimate feelings from moral judgments, we can and should eliminate the judgments that entail a commitment to moral luck.
The problem is that the example of Gauguin suggests morality is not the supreme source of value after all. Another way of trying to undermine the appeal of the Control Principle itself is to show how it might be mistaken for something else that is more plausible.
However, the unlucky driver themselves should voluntarily accept the notion of the special connection between their actions and the unfortunate consequences, and assign more blame to themselves than the lucky driver should. It involves an assessment of how much credit or discredit attaches directly to a person.
The problem Nagel points out, however, is that when we consider the sorts of things that influence us "Ultimately, nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control" Nagel,p. In the end, people are assessed for what they are like, not for how they ended up that way.
One strategy is to argue that moral luck is only a problem for an overly idealized conception of human agency. This clearly leaves room for clashes between the two sorts of justification, cases in which an action is morally unjustified, but rationally justified or vice versa.
See Williams,for the distinction. But the debate in legal theory about whether results should make a difference to punishment very often centers on the premise about control, and thus, the status of the Control Principle has important implications for the legal debates concerning differential punishment for attempts and completed crimes.
Nothing Nagel says clearly reveals his position on this point. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. Most writers who have responded to the problem fall somewhere in between; either they explicitly take a mixed approach or they confine their arguments to a carefully delineated subset of types of moral luck while remaining uncommitted with respect to the others.
Responses to the Problem Responses to the problem have been of two broad sorts: Our temptation is to avoid the other sorts of luck by focusing on what the person really is. For there is something in virtue of which he is responsible, namely, his being such that he would have freely performed the very same wrong actions had he been in the same circumstances as the Nazi sympathizer.
The only disparity is an external uncontrollable event. But it is important to recognize that there are many different kinds of moral assessment. It depends on what sort of luck, if any, was involved in the success or failure.
The problem is that, in any plausible case of this sort, it will not be rational for the driver to believe that he could not have driven more safely.
Let us understand egalitarianism as the view that a distribution of relevant goods that is more equal over a relevant population is more just than one that is less equal.
Here, too, it is clear that how one resolves the problem of moral luck—whether one rejects the possibility of moral luck altogether, accepts it in all forms, or accepts certain kinds and not others—has implications for the ultimate success of Luck Egalitarianism.
By the Control Principle, one is not responsible for these advantages and disadvantages. Interestingly, however, the Model Penal Code takes a different approach for at least some offenses, prescribing the same punishment for attempts and completed crimes.
If one is not responsible for these, then one is not deserving of them. Her views on these matters are controversial.Moral Luck Thomas Nagel Kant believed that good or bad luck should influence neither our moral judgment of a person and his actions, nor his moral assessment of himself.
Nagel sees this as, “the problem of moral luck.” A persons moral standing should not be affected by luck or chance, and the fact that luck plays such an essential role in determining whether a person is “good” or “bad,” morally, in the eyes of his peers is an inaccurate judgment.
In his essay “Moral Luck,” Nagel presupposes a simple but critical framework for thinking about moral judgments, which rests upon the notion of control. Succinctly put, people should be judged based upon what they freely and intentionally do.
Moral Luck Through Moral Luck, Nagel discusses the problem of moral luck and the conflict that arises between the common practice and intuition that most of society believes in regarding morality. Essays on Thomas nagels moral luck The Thomas nagels moral luck is one of the most popular assignments among students' documents.
If you are stuck with writing or missing ideas, scroll down and find inspiration in the best samples. The case of moral luck was introduced by Williams Bernard and developed by Thomas Nagel in their articles respectively. Both raised the question whether luck can influence the judgment of morality.
In this essay, the definition of moral luck and four kinds of moral luck by Williams and Nagel will be.Download